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This article describes the challenges of data governance in terms of the broader 
framework of knowledge commons governance, an institutional approach to gov-
erning shared knowledge, information, and data resources. Knowledge commons 
governance highlights the potential for effective community- and collective-based 
governance of knowledge resources.  The article focuses on key concepts within 
the knowledge commons framework rather than on specific law and public pol-
icy questions, directing the attention of researchers and policymakers to critical 
inquiry regarding relevant social groups and relevant data “things.” Both concepts 
are key tools for effective data governance.  
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In part the aim of the article is to provide a basic toolkit that is not 
tethered to immediate needs and that is adaptable and evolutionary 
in appropriate ways, as data governance questions challenge us to 
extend our imaginations. Some of this challenge is old. Along with 
researchers and industry, regulators and ethicists long ago began to 
confront the speed, breadth, and scale of the raw computing power 
now available at comparatively modest expense, so-called Big Data, 
and the rise of disciplines combined under the title “data science.” 
Law and regulation have grappled with widely-deployed artificial intel-
ligence (AI) systems, which feed on massive supplies of data. 
What is new, and what calls for newly-flexible modes of thinking and 
practicing, is the apparent demise of human comprehensibility at 
the center of technology design and deployment. Computing speed, 
scale, and autonomous execution of networked computer systems 
today operate in ways that effectively embody the absence of meaning-
ful limits on the humans’ capacity to discern patterns in data and to draw 
inferences from them. 
That concern is linked to virtually every area of human endeavor and 
more. Data undergirds both the “Internet of Things,” material objects 
and environmental contexts in which networked sensors and actua-
tors are embedded, and the “Internet of Bodies,” in which connected 
devices are attached to or ingested by human beings.1 The influences 
of data are seen in a growing number of techno-social systems, from 
manufacturing to health to politics.2 One can imagine our data-satu-
rated environment as a three-sided blend of the conceptual contri-
1 Andrea M Matwyshyn, ‘The Internet of Bodies’ (2019) 61 William and Mary 
Law Review 77.
2 Julie E Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Infor-
mational Capitalism (Oxford University Press 2019); Brett M Frischmann 
and Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering Humanity (Cambridge University Press 
2018).
1. Introduction
Law offers no single or simple answer to the problems and oppor-
tunities afforded by data. For data scientists, commercial entities, 
and policymakers which may ask, “how should data be generated, or 
stored, or transferred, or used?,” this article offers a short set of basic 
tools to use in developing suitable possibilities for governance and 
ethical practice.  This is neither a detailed list of prescriptions nor an 
inventory or checklist of remedies for current controversies.  Instead, 
the article offers two essential tools for imagining how to advance 
effective data governance. One consists of identifying and describ-
ing relevant social groups in which governance frameworks may 
be embedded. Two consists of identifying and describing relevant 
resources, or things, whose form and flow will contribute substan-
tially to the welfare effects of the relevant data governance systems.
In part the aim of the article is to broaden relevant perspectives. Pre-
paring the article followed a prompt to consider governing and regu-
lating “data markets” relative to innovation, growth, and societal pro-
gress. That premise risks cutting off the inquiry prematurely. Markets, 
including regulated markets, are often too simplistic as descriptions 
of relevant problems or solutions, given what is almost self-evidently 
a complex challenge. State or government control or supply, as the 
usual alternatives to market regulation of problematic social phenom-
ena, are likewise often too simplistic. Understanding data requires a 
broader view, adding the concept of commons governance to these 
two, in which “commons” embraces data sharing in some collectively 
managed or governed context. Data are almost always significant or 
valuable because they are shared. 
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butions of Claude Shannon as to information theory,3 Alan Turing as 
to computability,4 and Manuel Castells as to flows of power in the 
network society.5 
To render these broader issues in more tractable terms, data gov-
ernance asks more mundane questions: How do we get more data? 
Better data? More useful data? How do we control or limit data 
generation, or data distribution? How do we prevent or limit harms 
associated with data acquisition or retention? How do we increase, 
improve, or optimize social or economic value associated with data? 
How do we ensure that data are preserved appropriately, or made 
available for access appropriately? 
Lurking close by are related questions about data governance in the 
context of specific sectors, industries, and fields. What is the role of 
data governance relative to personal privacy, employment, finance, 
national security, public administration, public safety, health and 
medicine, education, transportation, arts and entertainment, and 
more? 
All the while, in almost all settings, understanding that we are sharing 
data, almost all of the time.
In sum, data governance must be able to accommodate both the 
broadest data-related questions asked above and also their con-
text-specific applications. Because of that breadth, this article teases 
out arguments related to foundational questions of data sharing, 
rather than responding to the litany of questions just identified as 
“mundane” or sector-specific. 
The article begins with a distinction between data form and data flow. 
This point is primarily descriptive.  It has to do with what we focus on 
rather than simply on what we find. Both as a technical construct and 
as a social one, data appear to have a quantum character, in loosely 
metaphorical terms, meaning that data exhibit multiple and seem-
ingly contradictory attributes. In any governance context, a critical and 
basic problem is: which attributes matter?
At times, data seem thing-like, a fixed object or objects capable of 
exclusive ownership and control and subject to regulation as if it were 
an artifact. That characterization of data-as-form seems most apt 
when data and datasets are subject to commodification and commer-
cialization efforts. 
At other times, and sometimes even at the same time, data seem 
wave-like, fluid, continuously evolving, even moving, aggregations of 
information that have power or effect by virtue of their scale or den-
sity on an ongoing basis rather than at a single moment. That charac-
terization of data-as-flow seems most apt when data and datasets are 
parts of research programs and are put to other public uses. 
In one sense data appear to be “private goods” and in another sense 
data appear to be “public goods,”6 but that distinction can be over-
stated. Data are not always or necessarily “goods” of any sort.  
The initial point is that the aims of data governance and regulation 
begin with exploring and describing both what data “is” and what 
data “ought to be,” not in ontological terms, but in social terms, 
framed by data-as-form or data-as-flow. Section 2 expands on this.
3 Claude Elwood Shannon and Warren Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of 
Communication (University of Illinois Press 1998).
4 Charles Petzold, The Annotated Turing: A Guided Tour through Alan Turing’s 
Historic Paper on Computability and the Turing Machine (Wiley Pub 2008).
5 Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (2nd ed. Wiley-Blackwell 
2010).
6 Sabina Leonelli, ‘Data — from Objects to Assets’ (2019) 574 Nature 317.
That apparently simple distinction is fraught with complexity. Break-
ing down that complexity is the function of the rest of this article, in 
Sections 3, 4, and 5 below, describing a governance toolkit.
To render the toolkit comprehensible beyond the corridors and 
conference rooms of regulators and lawyers, the tools are conceptual 
rather than doctrinal. A conceptual approach avoids entanglement 
in disciplinary debates.  In both descriptive and prescriptive senses, 
law has wrestled with the character of its basic approach to questions 
posed by knowledge and information, including data. One might 
start with issues of trade and commerce; or intellectual property 
and monopoly. One might focus instead on equity, autonomy, and 
dignity. A more integrative view would begin at a higher level of gen-
erality, asking whether regulatory challenges pose questions that are 
fundamentally private, including questions of contract (obligation) 
and tort, or fundamentally public, including questions of constitu-
tional order and administrative law. 
The article steers clear of such classification questions. It does not 
explore the details of specific legal systems or questions of legal 
rights and stakeholder interests. Instead, it situates questions of legal 
rule and governance strategy in the context of two distinctive con-
cerns: what about groups, and what about things? Data-as-form and 
data-as-flow state two responses to a basic problem that data govern-
ance should address. It should address them, as an initial matter, by 
examining data governance as a species of institutional governance, 
and specifically knowledge commons governance. Section 3 below 
addresses that topic in greater detail. 
The article likewise avoids undue reliance on the usual “either/or” 
questions that arise when law meets technology and when law meets 
information, such as individual rights vs. institutions and organi-
zations, and/or the state. Security and stability vs. innovation and 
opportunity. Exclusivity vs. openness. And so forth. Those are proper 
governance concerns, and critically exploring groups and things helps 
us see how to advance them in specific and systematic ways. 
But groups and things do something more. They open pathways into 
emerging research, scholarship, and (critically) experience that teach 
about a middle ground, in between markets and states, which is 
broad, useful, and too often overlooked, though it cannot be a pana-
cea or a perfect solution. That middle ground is knowledge commons, 
which means social groups operating in structured ways relative to 
shared data.
Care must be taken with the language of commons and with what 
the language signifies. This is an argument for nuanced governance 
of data as a shared resource rather than for any hasty or wholesale 
abandonment of private interests, markets, or even the state. This 
is also an argument for an ecological and evolutionary perspective on 
data and data governance, a perspective that includes accounts of 
the roles of different actors, agents, and resources in producing both 
productive and unproductive outcomes of data-related systems. The 
word “commons” evokes precisely such a system-level perspective.7
The discussion of knowledge commons leads, in Sections 5 and 6, 
into the article’s focus on two critical concepts: social groups, and 
things. These are high-level but nonetheless fundamental topics when 
investigating effective institutional governance of shared resources, 
such as data. And with those concepts, the article offers an introduc-
tory guide to fundamental data governance questions for the benefit 
of policymakers; institution and organization designers, builders, 
7 Donella H Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer (Diana Wright ed, Chel-
sea Green Publishing 2008).
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dis-aggregated. It can be a commodity itself. It lubricates social and 
technical process. It can be a vital component of numerous other 
technical and commercial applications. Data-as-flow captures the 
metaphorical instinct to look at data’s fluid attributes.
Related tensions between data as form and data as flow are sug-
gested by recent efforts by industry to clarify the meanings of 
metaphors such as “data lake” and “data warehouse” in describing 
modes of aggregating and managing data resources.12  A “data lake” 
may combine data from multiple sources, suggesting flows of data; a 
“data warehouse” may organize data from a single source, suggesting 
a well-structured form.
These are not rigid characterizations. One should not be misled by 
the description of data in metaphorical terms. The key point, illus-
trated by the necessity of metaphor, is that data are simultaneously 
form and flow. No one, single, correct description of data exists on 
which we may ground some correct regulatory system. The present, 
massive moment in computing history, exposing the gap between 
human cognitive capabilities and computing capabilities, calls for 
intellectual and pragmatic humility and pluralism. 
In that respect, it is important to amend the suggestion in the Intro-
duction that data governance should build on systems perspectives 
on the origins and functions of data.  Systems theory typically teaches 
a distinction between a resource system, sometimes referred to as a 
stock, and resource units, sometimes referred to as flows.  The polit-
ical scientist Elinor Ostrom, introducing her research on commons 
for natural resources, distinguished between fisheries and fish.13  That 
distinction is most sustainable where biophysical attributes deter-
mine the identities and boundaries of the stock and the units.  For 
data, biophysical attributes typically must give way to characterization 
and interpretation by humans, including differente modes of tech-
nology implementation .  A systems perspective is still appropriate, 
even critical, as this article argues below.  But identifying the relevant 
attributes of the system must be part of governance processes, rather 
than a lead-in to a governance processes.14
Three concrete contexts offer illustrations, before the article moves 
ahead to discussions of governance and resources more broadly, how 
current law, public policy, and practice rely on data-as-form and data-
as-flow as fundamental framing devices.  The illustrations are chosen 
because of the different respects in which they expose fundamental 
attributes of data in context. Here as elsewhere in this article, atten-
tion is drawn to concepts rather than to debates of the moment. 
2.2 Copyright and Data
The first is copyright law. Both in the US and in Europe, data and 
databases as such are subject either to no copyright protection (data 
lie in the public domain) or to minimal or thin copyright protection. 
In the US, the Supreme Court opinion that holds that copyrightable 
works must reflect at least a modicum of “creativity.”15 Logically-struc-
tured collections of facts and data almost always do not. European 
copyright recognizes copyright in works that reflect the author’s own 
12 Daniel E O’Leary, ‘Embedding AI and Crowdsourcing in the Big Data Lake,’ 
(2014) 29 IEEE Intelligent Systems 70.
13 Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 
Collective Action (Cambridge University Press 1990), p. 30.
14 Christiaan Hogendorn and Brett Frischmann, ‘Infrastructure and General 
Purpose Technologies: A Technology Flow Framework’ (2020) European 
Journal of Law and Economics http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10657-
020-09642-w accessed 29 April 2020.
15 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, Inc., 499 U.S. 340 
(1991).
and managers; and researchers and others who wish to find an initial 
hand-hold in this complex area. 
2. The Foundations of Data Pluralism
2.1 Data as Form, Data as Flow
It is a fiction that data “just is” (or “just are”), despite the fact that 
the word “data” itself derives from Latin for “given.” Data are mined, 
produced, constructed, collected, prepared, cleaned, scrubbed, pro-
cessed, analyzed, combined, sold, stored, and shared, all with explicit 
or implicit reliance on interpretive theories and models.8 
Many metaphors appear in that sentence, some more helpful, some 
of them less so. All of them, in one way or another, suggest the 
static character of data. In that sense, data are things; or objects; or 
commodities. Data are fixed items and collections of information, 
documenting observations about the world. By implication data are 
scarce (metaphorically speaking) and valuable. Data-as-form captures 
the metaphorical instinct to treat data as things, or as a thing.
Metaphors are as inescapable in law as they are elsewhere in social 
life. By allowing us to describe one (less familiar) phenomenon in 
terms of another (more familiar) phenomenon, metaphors both 
describe our thinking processes and promote understanding. If we 
want to solve a problem, we must capture the problem in its full 
scope and character. At their best, metaphors are tools for doing that. 
Yet metaphors are heuristics, and like all heuristics, they have their 
limitations and capacities to mislead. Data-as-form is, in this sense, 
incomplete.
One of the most popular umbrella metaphors for data is “the new 
oil.” The Economist, a magazine, invoked that metaphor with the 
headline, “The world’s most valuable resource is no longer oil, but 
data,” alluding to the ubiquity of data, the quantity of data, its value 
as both commodity and as social and technical lubricant, and the 
associated economic value and market power of firms that deal in 
data.9 The scholarly literature tends to join in the allusion.10 
“Data as [the new] oil” can be misleading. Oil is tangible, and oil 
reserves are depletable. In most senses, data are intangible, and 
pools or collections of data are not depletable. More recently, The 
Economist has invoked a competing metaphor, “data as sunlight,” 
signifying the fundamentally open character that data have, or should 
have.11
But some of the implications of the “oil” metaphor may be help-
ful. Oil is important and valuable partly because of its commodity 
character (oil in barrels rather than in untapped pools), but also partly 
because of its “infrastructural” qualities, in that it can be directed 
to numerous applications, with diverse value and values. Oil moves 
and flows, literally. Data are “flow” in related senses. Like oil, it is 
produced via complex technical processes. It can be “pooled” or 
8 Sabina Leonelli, ‘Data Governance Is Key to Interpretation: Reconceptualiz-
ing Data in Data Science’ (2019) Harvard Data Science Review https://hdsr.
mitpress.mit.edu/pub/4ovhpe3v accessed 7 February 2020.
9 The Economist, ‘The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but 
Data,’ 6 May 2017  https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-
worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data. 
10 Dawn E Holmes, Big Data: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford University 
Press 2017); Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A 
Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (Houghton 
Mifflin Harcourt 2013).
11 The Economist, ‘Digital Plurality: Are Data More Like Oil or Sunlight?,’ 20 
February 2020 https://www.economist.com/special-report/2020/02/20/
are-data-more-like-oil-or-sunlight.
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health and clinical medical strategies, and also to protect the interests 
of individuals in avoidable harm to interests in autonomy, privacy, 
and bodily integrity. 
The US has done this via the Common Rule, a formal regulatory 
standard that governs ethical practice in biomedical and behavioral 
research involving human subjects, when that research is conducted 
(as almost all such research in the US is) with the support of federal 
funding or in federally-supported institutions. It provides that iden-
tifiable individual research subjects must give consent both to their 
participation in research and also to uses of associated individual 
data. In effect the Common Rule interposes strong initial data-as-
form-based regulation on research programs animated by data-as-
flow considerations.
Blends of data-as-form and data-as-flow may change. The Com-
mon Rule has now been changed. As of January 2019,20 the Revised 
Common Rule substantially lowers the threshold for what amounts 
to “informed” content, meaning that research subjects no longer 
need to be provided with detailed and comprehensive information 
regarding uses to which “their” data may be put (quotation marks 
are included because, given the earlier discussion of copyright, the 
law may not support proprietary claims). It may be sufficient for 
researchers to disclose the simple fact that individual data may be 
shared. Data-as-form considerations are de-emphasized. Data-as-flow 
considerations are more prominent.
The illustration suggests both that neither data-as-form nor data-as-
flow is necessarily superior in normative terms and also that the two 
framings may be combined, as in the copyright illustration earlier, in 
complex ways. Adoption of the Revised Common Rule was prompted 
by the power and potential of medical and public health research 
grounded in Big Data techniques, where sharing and combining data 
from multiple sources is increasingly the norm.21 Critics point to 
alternative legal constructions, such as the European Union’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),22 which blend individual patient 
interests and commercial interests differently.23 The GDPR imposes 
significantly higher informed consent requirements with respect to 
storing and re-using individual health data. Normative assessment is 
complicated by additional data-as-form and data-as-flow attributes of 
US medical research systems. Authors of medical and public health 
research may be required by US law to share their research data by 
depositing data in public archives, a policy judgment based princi-
pally on data-as-flow.24 
20 Dept. of Homeland Security et al., Federal Policy for the Protection of 
Human Subjects, 82 Fed. Reg. 7149, 7150/1 (Jan. 19, 2017).
21 Willem G van Panhuis, Anne Cross and Donald S Burke, ‘Project Tycho 
2.0: A Repository to Improve the Integration and Reuse of Data for Global 
Population Health’ (2018) 25 Journal of the American Medical Informatics 
Association 1608.
22 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) OJ L 
[2016] 119/1.
23 A Michael Froomkin, ‘Big Data: Destroyer of Informed Consent’ (2019) 21 
Yale Journal of Law & Technology Special Issue 27; Lara Cartwright-Smith, 
Elizabeth Gray and Jane Hyatt Thorpe, ‘Health Information Ownership: 
Legal Theories and Policy Implications’ (2017) 19 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Entertainment and Technology Law 207.
24 Deborah Mascalzoni and others, ‘Are Requirements to Deposit Data in Re-
search Repositories Compatible with the European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation?’ (2019) 170 Annals of Internal Medicine 332.
intellectual creation.16 In practice that question is usually the “origi-
nality” of the work rather than the author’s skill and labor. In cases 
involving collections of facts and data, originality has often been lack-
ing.17 The point is that modern copyright tends to advance a doctrinal 
judgment that data are best conceived in terms of data-as-form (is 
the work, as “thing,” sufficiently original?) and that such a thing-like 
character is often absent.  Although data often are human-created, 
data are and should be difficult to capture, control, and own, because 
of their obvious social value. Data might be form, but are not. In 
practice, as a consequence, data are flow.
Both the data-as-form and data-as-flow constructs can be modified by 
rule and by practice. Data producers and data controllers often have 
recourse to alternative legal strategies, both in commercial contexts 
and in research and government setting. Data-as-form approaches 
are observed in access controls imposed via contract and/or via tech-
nology limitations, as well as via legislative efforts to secure forms of 
exclusivity in databases that do not sound in copyright. The European 
Parliament, recognizing the poor fit between copyright and data-
bases that is illustrated in the US by the Feist standard, adopted the 
so-called Database Directive in 1996. The Directive created a sui gen-
eris right to protect databases from appropriation, so long as the data-
base in question represents a “substantial investment” of resourc-
es.18 The inadequacies of that Directive have, in part, prompted the 
European Commission recently to propose a new “producer’s right’ 
in machine-generated data.19 Data-as-flow approaches are evident in 
contract, technology, and commercial considerations combined in 
“Data as a Service,” or “DAAS” arrangements. The categories are not 
rigid. The key is to see how they provide a conceptual foundation for 
the simultaneity of the conditions of day-to-day practice.
2.3 Public Health and Data
The second is law and public policy concerning public health and 
medical research. Data about individual health conditions and treat-
ments is collected, abstracted, and generalized both in order to build 
predictive models of disease and contagion used for population-level 
interventions and to build diagnostic heuristics and predictive models 
used for individual-level interventions. In both settings, where models 
are built and interventions applied, data-as-flow defines the practice. 
Where data are obtained or generated at the level of the individual 
patient or research subject, data-as-form may dominate. Data-as-form 
permit researchers and clinicians to describe the individual. Data-
as-form permit them to document a collection of attributes about 
the individual. Data-as-form support policymakers and advocates, in 
contexts that highlight privacy considerations and human rights, who 
assert that, intuitively, the data “belong” to the individual because in 
some respects the data originated with or in that person. Commer-
cial interests (and some research interests) claiming “ownership” of 
health-related data likewise invoke data-as-form arguments.
Legally, states have developed regulatory regimes to try to manage 
these conflicts, to protect the interests of researchers, the public, and 
commercial interests in generating better and more effective public 
16 Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 
77/20.
17 Lionel Bently and Brad Sherman, Intellectual Property Law (4th ed. Oxford 
University Press 2014); C-604/10 Football Dataco v. Yahoo! UK and Others 
[2012] EU:C:2012:115.
18 Article 7 of Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil of 11 March 1996 on the legal protection of databases [1996] OJ L 77/20.
19 Peter K Yu, ‘Data Producer’s Right and the Protection of Machine-Generat-
ed Data’ (2019) 93 Tulane Law Review 859.
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3.1 Governance
The concept of governance is used here in the sense of collective or 
coordinated decisionmaking by individuals working together, about 
decisions on matters of collective interest. The emphasis on govern-
ance, rather than on law, regulation or public policy specifically or on 
coordination in the abstract, is based on and justified with respect 
to a fundamental anthropological instinct rather than a formal or 
positive legal one. Governance means individuals working together 
to form groups to solve their own problems.27 A major thesis of this 
paper is that with respect to data, we should be asking about govern-
ance, not asking simply about law. Starting with governance opens 
the door to broader and more effective questioning about potential 
problems and solutions associated with data. Starting with markets 
or the state, per the Introduction, may pre-judge the character of 
both.
3.2 Institutions
Governance is best understood via its expression in institutions, 
rather than via the thoughts and behaviors of individuals. Indi-
viduals and their opportunities, thoughts, choices, and behaviors 
matter and, in a utilitarian sense, often matter most in final welfare 
judgments. But in practice, individual cognition and motivation are 
diverse. Efforts to understand governance primarily via references to 
an imaginary “model” human, responding to commands of the law, 
are destined to be unsatisfactory to the extent that the models do not 
match reality. This article foregrounds a framework that is grounded 
in empirics and pragmatics of institutions, meaning collections of 
individuals.
Governance is not limited, however, to formal institutions of the 
state, such as legislatures, courts, and administrative bodies. The 
reference to “institution” implies a broader view.
For a working definition of “institution,” the article adopts the defi-
nition given by the economist Douglass North: the rules of the game 
of a society, devised by humans and shaping human behavior.28 Also 
relevant, to similar if not identical effect, is the concept of the institu-
tion developed in modern sociology: institutions are stable behavioral 
patterns that reflect the coordinated behavior of individuals and 
organizations, where the relations define the actors rather than the 
other way around.29 
The difference between the two perspectives, the former focusing 
more on rules that guide or determine patterned behavior, and the 
latter focusing on rules that reflect patterned behavior, is not determi-
native here. What matters is that institutions in either sense (or both 
senses) simultaneously produce and rely on well-understood sets of 
human-created norms to determine outcomes among a group of peo-
ple who significantly self-identify with the enterprise in its own time. 
Groups may constitute and be denominated “communities” or “col-
lectives” or firms or other enterprises. Membership or participation 
may be small or large. Group identity may be formally circumscribed 
or informal, dynamic, and fluid. Groups may exist in specific places 
and times, as firms or as cities, for example. They may combine mate-
27 Donald E Brown, Human Universals (McGraw-Hill 1991); Stuart P Green, 
‘The Universal Grammar of Criminal Law’ (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review 
2104.
28 Douglass C North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Perfor-
mance (Cambridge University Press 1990).
29 Walter W Powell, ‘Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organ-
ization’ (1990) 12 Research in Organizational Behavior 295; John Frederick 
Padgett and Walter W Powell, The Emergence of Organizations and Markets 
(Princeton University Press 2012).
2.4 Biobanks and Data
A third illustration of diverse and changing uses of data-as-form and 
data-as-flow are biobanks, collections of biospecimens and related 
data derived from and used for research in both biomedicine and 
agriculture. Thousands of biobanks operate around the world storing 
tissue samples, genetic sequence information, and seeds, among 
other things. Their organizational structures are correspondingly 
diverse. Many are state-sponsored or supported. Some are private. 
Some are philanthropic. In cases where these enterprises collect and 
store data and physical specimens, as many do, their organizational 
design and governance and relevant legal regulation address data-as-
form and data-as-flow perspectives in two layers. 
One layer is biospecimens themselves, to which ethical, privacy, 
contractual, and tangible property interests may attach. They are 
data-as-form, in the sense of each biospecimen being a “thing,” and 
a collection of biospecimens being a distinct “thing.” Biospecimens 
are also data-as-flow, in that they are data as well as objects, and they 
have been collected and stored precisely because of their infrastruc-
tural, informational value to future researchers. A second layer is 
the informational data associated with the biospecimens, to which 
independent ethical, privacy, contractual, and intangible property 
interests may attach and which may have independent infrastructural 
importance for future research. The informational data are likewise 
data-as-form (the information associated with each specimen, and 
with a collection), and data-as-flow.25 
3. About Governance
Data-as-flow and data-as-form are rhetorical and propositional 
statements, but they are not pre-theoretical. They are not ontological 
statements about the true state of data. They are, by virtue of their 
metaphorical origins, judgments about the world, offered for their 
utility. They set out the initial conceptual vocabulary of this article. 
This Section provides the beginnings of its syntactical structure, 
which animates the analysis. If the challenge of data governance is 
identifying and advancing respects in which data-as-form should 
dominate data-as-flow, or the reverse, or neither, then how should 
that challenge be addressed?
This Section provides the first elements of a toolkit for analyzing situ-
ations and possibly recommending courses of action. It is a frame-
work, which describes governance, institutions of governance, and 
the knowledge commons framework as an instrument for researching 
governance. Knowledge commons gets particular attention here 
because it provides as systematic framework for examining govern-
ance of shared knowledge resources, and because data governance is 
above all else, perhaps, a complex and sustained challenge in manag-
ing shared resources in institutional contexts.
Like a useful theory, a useful framework teaches us what conditions 
matter and what to look for, and why. As a device for assembling evi-
dence, a framework should not be overly or prematurely precise and 
should initially accommodate multiple possible theories.26 
25 Michael J Madison, ‘Biobanks as Knowledge Institutions’ in Timo Minssen, 
Janne Rothmar and Jens Schovsbo (eds), Global Genes, Local Concerns: 
Legal, Ethical and Scientific Challenges in International Biobanking (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2019).
26 Elinor Ostrom and Michael Cox, ‘Moving beyond Panaceas: A Multi-Tiered 
Diagnostic Approach for Social-Ecological Analysis’ (2010) 37 Environmen-
tal Conservation 451.
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affect their value but not their existence. They suffer from no deplet-
ability problem. One significant problem is creating data resources 
in the first place, with the right attributes. Further resource-related 
questions are deferred to Section 5, below.
In part, and as relevant here, the tragic commons metaphor may 
mis-describe the actors involved. The tragic commons metaphor 
posits self-regarding, selfish decisionmaking actors with no means or 
motivation to acquire information about their neighbors’ activities, no 
ability to plan for the future, no practice of coordinating their actions 
with their neighbors’, and no capability for adaptation and innovation 
in the face of complexity.34 The metaphor assumes no governance. 
Instead, it assumes a sort of pre-governmental, pre-political state 
of nature, with no background customs or rules regarding collective 
identity or appropriate behaviors, and primitive, one-dimensional 
individuals. 
Obviously, the tragic commons metaphor is not intended generally to 
describe any actual world. But it may be taken as doing so, and when 
that happens, the metaphor may become something of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The failure of collective action that the metaphor predicts 
may provide a premise rather than a conclusion.
One may treat the production, consumption, and preservation of 
a shared resource as a challenge for collective action, rather than a 
failure of collective action. Can forms of collective action solve those 
challenges? Can those forms do so, particularly with respect to shared 
knowledge and information resources, in ways that are as welfare-en-
hancing as one supposes state production, distribution, and access?
3.4 Commons Governance
The path to a pluralistic modern understanding of institutional gov-
ernance and the potential strengths of resource sharing institutions 
arose initially via the research of Elinor Ostrom. First collected in the 
1990 book Governing the Commons,35 the work of Ostrom and her 
colleagues, collaborators, and students carefully established, via an 
abundance of fieldwork and comparative analysis, that self-directed 
collaboration and collective action to solve resource management 
problems was possible – in practice, if not always in theory. Ostrom’s 
adaptation of the “commons” framing not only enlarged policymak-
ers’ and scholars’ fields of vision relative to shared resource chal-
lenge. This work re-introduced the idea of “commons” in an explicitly 
ecological sense, referring to actors, institutions, and resources 
interacting in systems in multiple interdependent ways.36
In Governing the Commons and later work, Ostrom added to econo-
mists’ standard taxonomy of types of goods. Beginning with private 
goods (which area excludable and rivalrous), public goods (which are 
nonexcludable and nonrivalrous), and club goods (which are exclud-
able but nonrivalrous, and sometimes referred to as toll goods), she 
added and focused on “common-pool resource systems,” or “CPRs.” 
CPRs are resources, rather than goods, a definition that expands 
their utility and functions to include uses beyond tradeability and 
consumption. CPRs are nonexcludable and shared but depletable, and 
subject to risks of overconsumption. 
For common-pool resources, Ostrom described a series of consider-
ations, or guidelines, indicating when informal systems of collective, 
community management of the resource was both feasible – contrary 
34 Carol M Rose, ‘Commons and Cognition’ (2018) 19 Theoretical Inquiries in 
Law 587.
35 Ostrom, Governing the Commons (n 13). 
36 Brett M Frischmann, ‘Cultural Environmentalism and “The Wealth of Net-
works”’ (2007) 74 University of Chicago Law Review 1083.
rial and immaterial forms, transcending place and time in “imagined” 
communities of the sort described by Benedict Anderson.30 Groups, 
loosely specified, are critical loci of governance in institutions.31 
3.3 Institutional Governance of Resources
The rest of this Section offers a framework for investigating and 
understanding institutional governance of resources, including insti-
tutional governance relative to data, in ways that supplement the two 
usual sources of legitimate governance, states and markets.
Perhaps the most enduring and influential justification for the roles 
of markets and states in regulating resources, particularly relative 
to shared resources, is the story of the tragedy of the commons.32 
Modern researchers have come to identify the story closely with a 
well-known paper by the ecologist Garrett Hardin from 1968, but the 
story pre-dates Hardin’s work.
The tragic commons offers a powerfully simplistic metaphor. As a 
result the story has been simultaneously a diagnostic tool, an expla-
nation for historical developments, and a prescription. If resources 
are shared, they are likely to be over-exploited and ruined. To prevent 
the expected destruction, regulation should specify an actor or actors 
responsible for a defined set of resources, accountable either via the 
marketplace or via state mechanisms, and expect better results. 
Legal scholars often have assimilated the tragic commons meta-
phor to problems in the creation and circulation of information and 
knowledge, such as production of inventions, new cultural works, 
management of data, personal information, and interests in privacy. 
The stereotypical implication is state supply of legal exclusivities in 
relevant intangibles, to be traded in private markets. Alternatively, the 
state may simply supply the resource itself, directly (by building and 
controlling it) or indirectly (by underwriting it). The expected solu-
tions are intended to ensure that the resource exists in the first place, 
rather than over-exploited.
The tragic commons model works well in some settings. Positive law 
itself may at times be a resource that would not be adequately sup-
plied absent state direction.33 Various jurisdictions act differently on 
that institutional premise. US federal law is committed to the public 
domain. Other jurisdictions assert proprietary claims over the con-
tent of the law, in the name of the state. At best, in short, the tragic 
commons metaphor offers a helpful beginning. But its shortcomings 
are more significant. The inadequacies of the metaphor have been 
critiqued elsewhere at length. Only the briefest review is needed here. 
In part, the tragic commons metaphor may mis-describe the 
resources themselves, particularly as to knowledge and information 
resources, such as data. The tragic commons metaphor typically pos-
its a depletable resource. Even for tangible resources, that assump-
tion may not hold. Material resources, even biophysical resources 
such as grazing pastures, may be regenerated or resupplied. For 
intangible and immaterial resources, such as data, consumption may 
30 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism (Verso 1983).
31 Michael J Madison, ‘Social Software, Groups, and Governance’ (2006) 
2006 Michigan State Law Review 153.
32 Madelyn Sanfilippo, Brett Frischmann and Katherine Strandburg, ‘Privacy 
as Commons: Case Evaluation through the Governing Knowledge Com-
mons Framework’ (2018) 8 Journal of Information Policy 116. A ‘shared’ re-
source is one that is produced, used, and/or consumed by multiple actors, 
either concurrently or sequentially. 
33 Brigham Daniels, ‘Legispedia’ in Brett M Frischmann, Michael J Madison 
and Katherine J Strandburg (eds), Governing Knowledge Commons (Oxford 
University Press 2014).
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That style of analysis, if not that framework itself, is a critical step 
forward in understanding data governance.
Three, Ostrom highlighted the broad domain of successful resource 
governance strategies that rely neither on “market exclusivity” nor 
“state provision of a shared resource” (a strategy that would include a 
public policy declaring that a resource ought to be unowned and fully 
“open,” as a part of a “public domain”). She titled the address she 
delivered in association with receiving the Nobel Prize Beyond Market 
and States.43 
3.5 Knowledge Commons
The proposition that shared knowledge and information resources, 
such as data, ought to be subject to analysis and possible regulation 
via commons governance institutions of the sort just described, has 
been distilled into the knowledge commons research framework. 
That framework, described sometimes via the shorthand “GKC 
framework” after Governing Knowledge Commons, the title of the first 
volume of published knowledge commons research,44 is an analytic 
tool motivated both by frustration with the tragic commons meta-
phor, as applied to information, and also by the strengths and style 
of Ostrom’s research on commons. The GKC framework brings the 
ecological and systems spirit of that research into examinations of 
knowledge and information governance.
In contemporary research and policymaking, information produc-
tion problems are simplistically modeled as overconsumption and 
free riding by multiple actors with access to a shared knowledge 
resource, leading to depletion and eventually to underproduction. 
Stereotypical solutions follow, modeled either as exclusive property 
rights transacted in markets (patents, copyrights), or as public goods 
provisioned by or underwritten by state authorities (such as scien-
tific research). Problems of information privacy may be subject to 
equivalent stereotypical treatment, leading to proposals to vest strong 
exclusive privacy rights in individuals or to empower states to define 
privacy interests – to the exclusion of collectively self-directed privacy 
governance, in context.45
The GKC framework animates a research program intended to cap-
ture and inventory the domain of governance problems and solutions 
for knowledge and shared information resources. The GKC framework 
borrows its empiricism, its emphasis on context and setting, and its 
methodological pluralism from Ostrom’s IAD framework. Similarly, 
the GKC framework anticipates the later development of one more 
theories or models of institutional design, individual motivation, and 
normative assessment. While the GKC framework is styled in the 
manner of Ostrom’s IAD framework, it is not simply a special case 
of Ostrom’s thinking or the IAD framework as such. Other schol-
ars of information policy have similarly called for the development 
of governance strategies based on commons concepts: structured 
sharing.46 
Clarifying the terminology helps to introduce the details of commons 
governance as a system by which some community or collective 
establishes and enforces principles of managed access to a shared 
resource. The underlying resource may be “purely” intangible and 
immaterial or a blend of material and immaterial attributes. The 
43 Elinor Ostrom, ‘Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of 
Complex Economic Systems’ (2010) 100 American Economic Review 641.
44 Brett M Frischmann, Michael J Madison and Katherine Jo Strandburg 
(eds), Governing Knowledge Commons (Oxford University Press 2014).
45 Sanfilippo, Frischmann and Strandburg (n 32).
46 Jorge L Contreras and JH Reichman, ‘Sharing by Design: Data and Decen-
tralized Commons’ (2015) 350 Science 1312.
to the prediction of the tragic commons metaphor – and likely to 
generate sustained, welfare-promoting provision of that resource 
over time.37 The word “commons” comes forward in this article from 
Ostrom’s work. “Commons” means not fully open, unmanaged 
access to a resource, but instead collective institutional governance 
of a resource, embodying a set of strategies that solve coordination 
problems, known as social dilemmas. That mouthful of a phrase can 
be distilled into something shorter: commons means groups that 
engage in managed resource sharing. Institutional governance via 
groups may take the place of or exist in tandem with governance via 
exclusive rights and markets, (on the one hand) and governance via 
state provision or determination (on the other hand). 
In highlighting the possible virtues of commons-based institutional 
governance of resources, Ostrom’s work is important here in three 
respects.
One, Ostrom’s guidelines for successful commons management 
have no direct or obvious utility in domains related to knowledge, 
information, and data. Virtually all of the research conducted for 
Governing the Commons and follow-on research focused on natural 
(i.e., biophysical) resources, such as water systems, forests, fisheries, 
and pasturage, which easily fit Ostrom’s definition of a CPR. Though 
late in her career Ostrom and her colleague Charlotte Hess under-
took some preliminary explorations of commons governance related 
to knowledge resources,38 those efforts should be regarded more as 
encouraging further investigation rather than as definitive applica-
tions of Ostrom’s work in new domains. Despite some preliminary 
efforts to apply Ostrom’s work to data governance,39 shareable 
knowledge, information, and data resources do not meet the defini-
tion of CPRs. In intangible, immaterial forms, knowledge resources 
are neither excludable nor depletable. Ostrom’s commons guide-
lines should be set aside with respect to data governance. Whether 
and how collective- or community-based governance of data should 
function is a matter to be investigated afresh, via examining condi-
tions in the field.40 Ostrom’s body of work exhibits a strong sympathy 
for collective self-determination and a strong skepticism of the role 
of the state, via formal property rights systems or otherwise. Those 
intuitions deserve empirical exploration in contexts related to data.
Two, Ostrom showed that understanding and developing effective 
institutional governance requires a strong dedication to empiricism 
and to comparative, contextual analysis.41 Ostrom and her colleagues 
were motivated in part by specific resistance to the simplistic con-
ceptual reasoning that is often associated with casual adoption of the 
tragic commons metaphor. In that spirit, Ostrom formalized her style 
of research in a strategy labeled the “Institutional Analysis and Devel-
opment” framework (IAD) in order to support additional research.42 
37 Ostrom, Governing the Commons (n 13).
38 Charlotte Hess and Elinor Ostrom (eds), Understanding Knowledge as a 
Commons: From Theory to Practice (MIT Press 2007); Charlotte Hess and 
Elinor Ostrom, ‘Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Com-
mon-Pool Resource’ (2003) 66 Law & Contemporary Problems 111.
39 Joshua B Fisher and Louise Fortmann, ‘Governing the Data Commons: 
Policy, Practice, and the Advancement of Science’ (2010) 47 Information & 
Management 237.
40 For the argument that Ostrom’s instincts regarding governance, but not 
the details of Ostrom’s program, should be applied to information privacy 
regulation, see Jane K Winn, ‘The Governance Turn in Information Privacy 
Law’ (2019) SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 3418286 https://papers.ssrn.com/
abstract=3418286 accessed 7 February 2020.
41 Brett M Frischmann, ‘Two Enduring Lessons from Elinor Ostrom’ (2013) 9 
Journal of Institutional Economics 387.
42 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton University 
Press 2005).
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structured sharing.53
Knowledge commons governance is neither rare nor novel, nor is 
it limited to specific economic or cultural niches, such as small 
communities. The GKC framework supplies a means of describing 
the breadth of the field in a systematic way. The functionality of 
durable knowledge commons governance – broadly across technical 
and cultural domains, at different scales, and in specific cases – has 
been demonstrated in cases across a diverse range of contemporary 
and historical settings, including both technology development and 
cultural creation.54  Janis Geary and Tania Bubela provide an exem-
plary case study of knowledge commons in a specific and focused 
case of contemporary life sciences research.55 Knowledge commons 
has been used to analyze the field of microbial biology.56 The GKC 
framework is consistent with research on patent pools, open source 
software development, and clearinghouses57 and other institutions 
for collective governance of shared resources, including data and 
datasets. These have been documented in historical settings,58 in 
less developed countries,59 in large-scale, critical scientific and health 
related research networks,60 in large scale commercial settings,61 and 
in Big Data-enabled scientific research communities.62
3.6 Rules and Norms
The GKC framework is primarily descriptive, rather than normative. It 
aims to surface attributes of institutions via examination of specific 
cases for potential comparative assessment, using tools borrowed 
in part from social science, in part from the humanities, and in part 
from law. (The framework is intended to be accessible to and usable 
by researchers from each of these domains.) Users of the framework 
and students of knowledge commons research often focus on the 
systems of formal and informal rules, norms, customs, and practices 
by which communities and collectives govern themselves and govern 
relevant resources. In GKC research as in much of Ostrom’s work, 
these are “rules in use,” signifying their empirical rather than norma-
tive status. For purposes of comparative institutional analysis, these 
rules in use may be productively compared with rules and norms in 
evidence in market-based governance systems and those prescribed 
53 Frischmann, Madison and Strandburg (n 44).
54 Frischmann, Madison and Strandburg (n 44); Katherine J Strandburg, Brett 
M Frischmann and Michael J Madison (eds), Governing Medical Knowledge 
Commons (Cambridge University Press 2017).
55 Janis Geary and Tania Bubela, ‘Governance of a Global Genetic Resource 
Commons for Non-Commercial Research: A Case-Study of the DNA Bar-
code Commons’ (2019) 13 International Journal of the Commons 205.
56 JH Reichman, PF Uhlir and Tom Dedeurwaerdere, Governing Digitally In-
tegrated Genetic Resources, Data, and Literature: Global Intellectual Property 
Strategies for a Redesigned Microbial Research Commons (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2016).
57 Geertrui van Overwalle (ed), Gene Patents and Collaborative Licensing Mod-
els: Patent Pools, Clearinghouses, Open Source Models, and Liability Regimes 
(Cambridge University Press 2009).
58 Tine de Moor, ‘From Historical Institution to Pars Pro Toto: The Commons 
and Their Revival in Historical Perspective’ in Blake Hudson, Jonathan 
Rosenbloom and Dan Cole (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Study of the 
Commons (Routledge 2019).
59 Jeremy De Beer and others (eds), Innovation & Intellectual Property: Collabo-
rative Dynamics in Africa (Published by UCT Press in association with the IP 
Unit, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town and Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 2014).
60 Amy Kapcynski, ‘Order without Intellectual Property Law: Open Science in 
Influenza’ (2017) 106 Cornell Law Review 1593.
61 Henry Chesbrough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and 
Profiting from Technology (Harvard Business School Press 2003).
62 Michael J Madison, ‘Commons at the Intersection of Peer Production, 
Citizen Science, and Big Data: Galaxy Zoo’ in Brett M Frischmann, Michael 
J Madison and Katherine J Strandburg (eds), Governing knowledge commons 
(Oxford University Press 2014).
resource may be characterized by intellectual property rights and/
or other exclusivity interests. The resource may originate in informa-
tion that is characterized by no IP rights (public domain status). A 
patent pool and a data pool are both forms of knowledge commons, 
as the term commons is used here. A newsgathering and distribution 
collective, such as the Associated Press “wire” service, is a form of 
knowledge commons, although individual news stories are typically 
subject to few if any formal IP rights and in some countries, notably 
the US, are treated as presumptively open by virtue of constitutional 
requirements.47 The relationship between the legal status of the 
underlying resource and the character of the resource management 
system is a question to be explored, not declared. Neither ownership 
nor openness is the end of the matter. 
Commons governance includes a range of institutional governance 
practices under the “commons” umbrella. Because knowledge and 
information resources may be defined and regulated by positive 
law, commons governance systems and market-based systems and 
formal state regulation may be linked and overlap in specific contexts. 
Further, no bright line exists to divide knowledge commons, which are 
directed primarily to information resources, from other sorts of com-
mons, such as natural resource and environmental commons studied 
by Ostrom and her colleagues, and urban commons, which refer 
to governance of urban planning and design.48 The acronym CPR, 
which in social science research refers to “common-pool resource,” 
also appears in property law theory as “common property regime,” a 
commons-like governance system anchored in analyses of infrastruc-
tural resources such as roads. Common property regimes highlight 
increasing returns to scale as more and more people consume a 
resource of a given size.49 Infrastructural resources, because of their 
shared character, are often governed as commons.50 The practice of 
“commoning” usually refers to politically or ideologically-motivated 
practices combining local resource governance institutions and 
self-directed community governance.51
The details of the GKC framework as a research instrument are 
described elsewhere.52 The key insight of the framework is not 
whether the institution “is” or “is not” a commons. Rather, the 
question answered by the framework is whether and how some 
knowledge or information resource is governed as a shared resource 
via some community or collective, as an alternative to knowledge 
governance in markets, founded on claims of exclusivity of right, 
such as patents or copyrights or to knowledge governance via state 
intervention, provision, or subsidy. Commons governance systems 
may play important roles with respect to market-based and govern-
ment-supplied resources. The question is whether some knowledge 
or information resource presents, in substantial part, hallmarks of 
47 Michael J Madison, Brett M Frischmann and Katherine J Strandburg, ‘Con-
structing Commons in the Cultural Environment’ (2010) 95 Cornell Law 
Review 657.
48 Sheila R Foster and Christian Ianone, ‘Ostrom in the City: Design Princi-
ples and Practices for the Urban Commons’ in Blake Hudson, Jonathan 
Rosenbloom and Dan Cole (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Study of the 
Commons (Routledge 2019).
49 Carol M Rose, ‘The Comedy of the Commons: Commerce, Custom, and 
Inherently Public Property’ (1986) 53 University of Chicago Law Review 711.
50 Brett M Frischmann, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources 
(Oxford University Press 2012).
51 David Bollier and Silke Helfrich (eds), Patterns of Commoning (Common 
Strategies Group 2015).
52 Michael J Madison, Brett M Frischmann and Katherine J Strandburg, 
‘Knowledge Commons’ in Blake Hudson, Jonathan Rosenbloom and Dan 
Cole (eds), Routledge Handbook of the Study of the Commons (Routledge 
2019).
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so cooperatively rather than being coerced to do, than is predicted by 
tragic commons metaphors and presumptions of selfish behavior fol-
lowing the pursuit of rational self-interest.65 Trust may operate bilater-
ally, between individuals or between an individual and an institution. 
Trust also operates critically among populations of individuals and 
an institution. For governance by groups, social trust mechanisms 
must operate at some level among the members of the group, relative 
to one another and relative to the purposes of the group. It has been 
argued that trust generally consists of means by which individuals 
cope with the fact that others may exercise their own freedom.66 But 
no single, optimal definition of trust exists. 
Likewise, no single social or policy mechanism works universally to 
promote trust and promote group formation, identity, durability, or 
adaptability, or to undermine trust or to prevent it from forming. 
Group-based resource governance may be unhelpful or harmful, or 
may create unmanageable conflict with other governance institu-
tions. The research literature on trust and cooperation is vast, and it 
covers sociological, anthropological, economic, political science, and 
philosophical domains.67 Emphasizing reciprocal relations between 
community members, for example, is sometimes suggested as a 
critical ingredient in effective cooperative settings, an idea that may 
be traced back to early work on gift economies. But the details matter. 
“Pay it forward” reciprocity strategies may be as important to trust 
formation as “pay it back” strategies, or more so.68 Trust creation and 
reinforcement may depend on relationships among group decision-
making rules (such as enforcement norms, or exit/entry criteria) and 
the development of shared collective identity (such as “who we are” 
questions). 
This makes trust an ecological and structural question as well as a 
matter of individual cognition.69 The research and policy challenge 
is to design and support institutions where the benefits of individ-
uals’ cooperative capabilities can be put to good use, where shared 
resources can be governed effectively, and where the weaknesses of 
a trust-based model are minimized. Cooperative capabilities are une-
venly distributed, for example, and trust mechanisms may be riddled 
with harmful power and influence dynamics. Trust is itself, signifi-
cantly, a shared resource, and governance of that resource is likely 
necessary as part of broader resource governance strategy.
4.2 Polycentricity
That trust is a shared resource subject to governance, as part of gov-
ernance of a shared knowledge resource such as data, points to the 
idea that governing groups may overlap and intersect. Polycentricity 
captures that concept, in the sense that any institutional design for 
governance is likely to be most effective when it is characterized and 
implemented in a decentered way, with multiple loci of authority and 
responsibility, rather than a single center of regulatory agency, inter-
secting with one another at different scales70 and relying on individu-
als’ diverse motivations for participating.71
65 Bo Rothstein, Social Traps and the Problem of Trust (Cambridge University 
Press 2005).
66 Niklas Luhmann, Trust and Power (English edition, Polity 1979).
67 Diego Gambetta (ed), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (B 
Blackwell 1990).
68 Toshio Yamagishi and Karen S Cook, ‘Generalized Exchange and Social 
Dilemmas’ (1993) 56 Social Psychology Quarterly 235.
69 Kenneth W Abbott, Jessica F Green and Robert O Keohane, ‘Organizational 
Ecology and Institutional Change in Global Governance’ (2016) 70 Interna-
tional Organization 247.
70  Julia Black, ‘Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in 
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes’ (2008) 2 Regulation & Governance 137.
71 Yochai Benkler, ‘Law, Innovation, and Collaboration in Networked Econo-
in state-based regulatory settings. For students and practitioners of 
data governance, the intuitive answer to “how should we regulate?” 
takes the form of “these are the appropriate rules.”
In the context of knowledge governance, the temptation to prioritize 
examination of the rules, empirically or normatively, may be resisted. 
It risks putting the proverbial cart before the horse. The review of 
commons governance shows why: commons governance is collec-
tive management of a shared resource by or in a group. The role of 
the collective is largely to define its own governance system relative 
to dilemmas associated with specified resources, producing a form 
of institutional governance in context. This article has described 
the fundamental problem of governing data sharing in terms of two 
conceptions, data-as-form and data-as-flow. It argues next that under-
standing data governance should begin not with the rules, but instead 
with two key phenomena: groups and things.
4. About Groups
“Groups” means formal and informal collections of people, who 
identify themselves with the group (perhaps closely, perhaps loosely, 
and perhaps in variable numbers over time) and who adopt and 
enact practices that are aligned with the interests and identities of 
the group. When knowledge commons governance research refers to 
institutional governance of shared resources by self-directed commu-
nities and collectivities, it refers to groups solving social dilemmas 
regarding those resources. Beyond Markets and States, the title of 
Ostrom’s Nobel Prize address, is read fairly to claim that governance 
by groups is an empirically valid mode of resource management.
In practice, that summary opens at least three key lines of inquiry as 
conceptual matters. 
The first is the most pragmatic: In a resource governance context, 
does one or more groups exist that might serve as governance vehi-
cles? How might such a group be identified, defined, and organized? 
Should law or regulation be invoked to motivate or to discourage 
group formation as part of an institutional governance strategy? 
The second concerns the possible governance contributions by 
groups. Groups might generate relevant rules, norms, and practices 
on their own, such as a voluntary association, or might serve as 
agents for administering and enforcing rules and norms generated 
elsewhere, such as employees of a for-profit firm. Groups might serve 
as collective institutions in a cognitive sense, so that the collective is 
able to identify and act on information that is not equally accessible 
or useful to individuals acting alone. Groups might act as loci for 
interpretive practices by which society gives shape and meaning to 
places and resources, as suggested in multiple traditions of Science 
and Technology Studies. In each of these respects, where present, 
groups may participate in resource governance practices.63
The third and most important here concerns ways in which groups 
may be anchors for two especially critical conceptual foundations for 
institutional governance of shared resources: trust and polycentricity. 
Data governance strategies should explore both.
4.1 Trust
Trust represents the sense that trust mechanisms are critical to 
cooperative arrangements.64 It also represents the sense that actual 
human beings have greater capabilities for understanding and adapt-
ing to complex social and environmental challenges, and for doing 
63 Madison, ‘Social Software, Groups, and Governance’ (n 31).
64 Kenneth Joseph Arrow, The Limits of Organization (Norton 1974).
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render information about them “legible,” as data (data-as-form).76 He 
argues that alternatives to the modern state, in localized, collective 
self-governance, may be equally effective at promoting well-being and 
offers the benefit of maintaining critical distances between the state 
and its subjects (data-as-flow). 
5. About Things
“Things” captures a broad range of related phenomenon: items, 
units, commodities, embodiments, objects, artifacts, and stuff, 
both material and immaterial, analog and digital. With such a broad 
beginning, semantics and ontologies can get tricky, and interpretive 
techniques must be developed to sort out relevant distinctions.77 
One object may embody more than one thing, and one thing may be 
embodied in more than one object. A “work of art” such as a novel 
may embody a distinct “work of authorship” or “copyright work”; that 
copyright work may be embodied in numerous copies of the novel. 
One thing, such as a the novel, may be part of another thing, such 
as a library, and may itself consist of other things, such as literary 
elements, and chapters. Identity is another concern. In the larger col-
lection, the smaller unit may be separable. But not always. A gallon of 
water poured into a river mixes inseparably with the rest of the river. 
A gallon of water can be extracted from the river, but that gallon is not 
the same gallon as the water previously poured in. Origins, posses-
sion, and authenticity also shape the definitions, meanings, and pur-
poses of things. Things are often associated with specific individuals. 
They are also often associated with social groups.
The word “thing” is a broad and inclusive way to refer to “resource,” 
as that word and concept have contributed earlier to discussions of 
governance. When knowledge commons governance research refers 
to institutional governance of shared resources by self-directed com-
munities and collectivities, it refers to groups solving social dilem-
mas regarding the creation, use, and preservation of things, treating 
things as a flexible category that allows researchers and analysts to 
explore widely.
In practice, that summary opens at least two key lines of inquiry as 
conceptual matters. 
The first returns to the prompt with which the article began: the 
essential distinction between data-as-form and data-as-flow. That dis-
tinction suggests asking, foundationally, what is a thing, and how do 
we know? Whereas the last Section built conceptually on the contribu-
tions of Elinor Ostrom, to a sizable degree this Section moves beyond 
Ostrom. Ostrom’s work on institutional governance and commons 
typically relied heavily on analysis of natural resources, which come 
to us with given and mostly unmodifiable biophysical attributes. 
Ostrom’s later work, on knowledge, tended to treat “knowledge” as 
a single, undifferentiated resource. Neither approach suits the GKC 
framework. Neither approach suits data.
The second concerns relationships between groups and things. Those 
relationships are often fundamentally ecological and systemic. The 
social groups that construct and manage resources may be produced, 
reinforced, and reproduced by the identity of the resource and by the 
group’s governance practices relative to the resource, both as to the 
internal dynamics of social groups and as to relationships between 
social groups.78 How should those relationships be explained?
76 James C Scott, Seeing like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed (Yale University Press 2008).
77 Michael J Madison, ‘IP Things as Boundary Objects: The Case of the Copy-
right Work’ (2017) 6 Laws 13.
78 John Seely Brown and Paul Duguid, The Social Life of Information (Harvard 
Those multiple centers may be informal or formal or blends of the 
two. Groups may be organized hierarchically. Smaller groups may be 
“nested” within a larger group. Groups may be linked to on another 
in a network of distinct and/or overlapping nodes of different scales. 
Polycentric systems can be flexible and adaptable across time, scale, 
and community form. They can support enforcement and accounta-
bility mechanisms at different scales, enhancing legitimacy, accounta-
bility, and administrability of governance systems as a whole.
So, just as trust is a key governance variable to be explored, polycen-
tricity does not solve all problems. One must still carefully consider 
the scope of authority and its mechanisms of accountability and legit-
imacy. Like all governance systems, and like trust, polycentric systems 
are subject to appropriation and abuse via dynamics of power, wealth, 
and status. Polycentricity is not a cure-all. It is an analytic strategy, 
and polycentric systems can be made stronger and weaker.72 
4.3 Groups and Data
Group-based perspectives, including polycentric governance and 
emphasis on structures that both generate and rely on social trust, 
are consistent with but perhaps more nuanced and potentially 
effective than other norm-based approaches that are not so explicitly 
pluralistic. Governance of shared data resources with reference to 
groups helps us organize possible strategies distinguished as data-
as-form and data-as-flow. The absence of relevant groups relative to 
those data resources suggests a different range of strategies distin-
guished along those lines. For example, certain approaches to “open” 
data governance (a species of data-as-flow) may be better appreciated 
and have greater impact if described as parts of polycentric govern-
ance, including “best practices” recommendations; “fair practices” 
approaches, such as the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPP) 
for personal data collection and the FAIR Data Principles for scientific 
data management; suggestions that all of data or all of knowledge 
constitutes a single, global shared resource;73 and advocacy under 
labels such as Open Science and Open Data. In these contexts, 
“openness” and “fair” practices are achieved by paying careful atten-
tion to institutional attributes of groups and fields.74 
Historical data governance practices are similarly illuminated by pri-
oritizing questions about groups, trust, and polycentricity. The histo-
rian Will Slauter argues persuasively that seventeenth century English 
publishers strategized ways to obtain exclusivity in shipping and price 
information (data-as-form).75 Modern copyright and its near-total 
exclusion of data from legal ownership is in many respects a product 
of those strategies, their modern analogs, and resistance by other 
groups in UK and American legal systems (data-as-flow). The political 
scientist James Scott suggests, provocatively, that central state 
authority exists not only to enhance the well-being of citizens but to 
my and Society’ (2017) 13 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 231.
72 Black (n 70). The next Section offers a parallel point regarding resource 
systems themselves, which can be designed flexibly to operate at greater 
or lesser scales.  The cognitive scientist Herbert Simon characterized 
organisms with this character as “nearly decomposable.” He argued that 
the “decomposability” strategy for managing adaptation in complex envi-
ronments rendered such organisms particularly fit in evolutionary terms. 
HA Simon, ‘Near Decomposability and the Speed of Evolution’ (2002) 11 
Industrial and Corporate Change 587.
73 Hess and Ostrom, ‘Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Com-
mon-Pool Resource’ (n 38); Jennifer Shkabatur, ‘The Global Commons of 
Data’ (2019) 22 Stanford Technology Law Review 354.
74 Liz Lyon, Wei Jeng and Eleanor Mattern, ‘Research Transparency: A Prelim-
inary Study of Disciplinary Conceptualisation, Drivers, Tools and Support 
Services’ (2017) 12 International Journal of Digital Curation 46.
75 Will Slauter, Who Owns the News? A History of Copyright (Stanford Universi-
ty Press 2019).
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specified by surveyors.82  
In domains of knowledge and information, including data, the 
absence of a standard or uniform material reference (unlike land) 
means that the role of social relationships in constituting things and 
resources, both in social life and in legal processes, is both broader 
and deeper.83 The argument draws on research in Technology Studies 
and Information Science, rather than legal scholarship.84 Scholars 
have researched access to immaterial goods;85 have explored govern-
ance of resources that generate additional resources (so-called “gen-
erative” phenomena);86 and explored modern technologies such as 
open source computer programs, in which the group and the object 
constitute each other.87
Observing that things may be constructed socially, particularly for 
purposes of governance, does not imply that those processes of 
construction are simple or straightforward. (Nor does it imply that 
material objects do not have a physical reality.) The variability and 
complexity of those processes; the possibilities that they may or may 
not be linear and/or purposeful; the fact that they likely involve multi-
ple social systems, including law; and the reality that individual actors 
in those systems, even within social groups, may have conflicting 
motivations, are precisely what give rise to the need to examine those 
processes critically.88 
In commercial law settings, for example, two actors may agree by 
contract to treat a dataset as a tradeable commodity even while 
formal IP law considers that same information to be unowned and 
unownable. Customary practices in many fields construct domains 
of things for disciplinary purposes, such as the “copy” that has been 
the unit of text for both publishers and journalists. For public policy 
reasons, legal institutions may declare an absence of thing-like char-
acter, in order to deprive others of the power to claim property-like 
exclusivity in them. Patent law resists granting exclusive rights in laws 
of nature and abstract ideas. Property scholars who are committed 
to the central role of “things” in property law have begun to explore 
the legal “toolkit” of doctrines and arguments needed to construct 
property resources at different scales, producing an architecture of 
property things.89
As noted earlier, the GKC framework for researching knowledge 
82 Maureen E Brady, ‘The Forgotten History of Metes and Bounds’ (2019) 128 
Yale Law Journal 872.
83 Michael J Madison, ‘Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things’ 
(2005) 56 Case Western Reserve Law Review 381.
84 Geoffrey C Bowker and Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things out: Classification 
and Its Consequences (MIT Press 1999); Bruno Latour, Reassembling the 
Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (Oxford University Press 
2007); Henry Petroski, The Pencil: A History of Design and Circumstance 
(Knopf 2006). 
85 Jessica C Lai and Antoinette Maget (eds), Intellectual Property and Access to 
Im/Material Goods (Edward Elgar Publishing 2016).
86 Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It (Yale Univer-
sity Press 2008).
87 Christopher M Kelty, Two Bits: The Cultural Significance of Free Software 
(Duke University Press 2008); Charles M Schweik and Robert C English, 
Internet Success: A Study of Open-Source Software Commons (MIT Press 
2012).
88 Ellen P Goodman (ed), The Atomic Age of Data: Policies for the Internet of 
Things (Annual Aspen Institute Conference on Communications Policy 
2015).
89  Thomas W Merrill and Henry E Smith, ‘The Architecture of Property’ in 
Hanoch Dagan and Benjamin Zipursky (eds), Research Handbook on Private 
Law Theories (Edward Elgar Publishing Forthcoming) <https://papers.ssrn.
com/abstract=3462643> accessed 7 February 2020; Lee Anne Fennell, 
Slices and Lumps: Division and Aggregation in Law and Life (University of 
Chicago Press 2019).
5.1 What is a Thing
Identifying and defining things are problems in epistemology that 
go back to Aristotle. The question here is not so broad. The question 
is governance: what are the things that form parts of governance 
systems? What are resource systems, and what are resource unit? 
Borrowing the concept of polycentricity, how do multiple resource 
systems interact, overlap, and align? Where do relevant resources 
come from; how are relevant resources used, consumed, and applied; 
and how, if at all, are relevant resources preserved over time? Data-as-
form and data-as-flow are then both inputs into governance analysis 
and outcomes of governance analysis.
For biophysical resources, answers to most of these questions may 
be relatively straightforward; resources are the objects of governance. 
For knowledge and information resources, including data, resources 
are both subject and objects of governance. Governance often creates 
(produces, consumes, preserves) the things to which governance 
applies. Prioritizing things in governance is a way of prioritizing a key 
set of critical questions. Pragmatically, a critical perspective on gov-
ernance means that little turns on classifications of things resources 
as inherently private goods, public goods, club or toll goods, or com-
mon-pool resources. The tools of law and policy as well as the expe-
riences of social life teach that boundaries and classifications among 
these categories can be modified in many settings, disrupting what 
otherwise might be standard prescriptions based on the logic that 
gives priority attention to commons tragedies. A functional approach, 
based on an empirical approach to ecologies in practice, is preferred. 
Data depend on their reference and relationships to underlying 
phenomena. In that sense, data are evidence of something else.79 
They are, almost by definition, both things in themselves and also 
versions of something else. Data signify a problem long recognized 
in mathematics, computer science, geography, and literature: to be 
useful, a model or map must stand in for the whole but not be identi-
cal to it.80 Data are sometimes characterized as “raw” or “cooked,” a 
metaphorical framing that suggests the degree to which data directly 
(raw, unprocessed) or indirectly (cooked, processed and analyzed) 
relate to their source. The metaphor departs from its partial origins 
in the anthropological literature, as a reference to the construction of 
conceptual oppositions.81 But the allusion gets at something equally 
fundamental. Both the identity and the attributes of data, databases, 
and datasets, including attributes implicating exclusivity and sharea-
bility, are matters of design as well as physics or economics. 
5.2 Things and Groups
Significantly, social groups are among the most fundamental “design-
ers,” even with respect to such traditional resources as property 
in land. The legal historian Molly Brady, for example, has carefully 
documented that the historical meaning of the phrase “metes and 
bounds” in the law of real property refers to boundaries identified by 
local social and community practices, rather than to fixed boundaries 
Business School Press 2000); Madison, ‘Commons at the Intersection of 
Peer Production, Citizen Science, and Big Data: Galaxy Zoo’ (n 73); Thom-
as C Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Harvard Univ Press 1960); Susan 
Leigh Star and James R Griesemer, ‘Institutional Ecology, `translations’ 
and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum 
of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39’ (1989) 19 Social Studies of Science 387.
79 Christine L Borgman, Big Data, Little Data, No Data: Scholarship in the 
Networked World (MIT Press 2015).
80 Brian Cantwell Smith, ‘The Limits of Correctness’ (1985) 14,15 ACM SIG-
CAS Computers and Society 18.
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adigm for managing super-large datasets in a distributed comput-
ing environment.96  
• Processes and systems of data stewardship, which emphasize 
cleaning, scrubbing, normalizing, manipulating, classifying, and 
maintaining data for storage, analysis, use and application.97 Data 
ontologies, data schema, and data storage techniques and models 
are critical to ensure both technical synthesis and interoperability 
where data from multiple sources are brought together for use as 
shared resources, as in data repositories or other data infrastruc-
tures.
• Analytics, interpretations, and applications. These occupy an 
enormous analytic space in their own right, because “data” as gov-
ernance subjects overlap with “algorithms,” “AI,” and “platforms” 
as technologies and institutions for data mining strategies; pattern 
analysis; and services, products, and new knowledge forms built 
on those patterns, as governance subjects. As machine learning 
technologies enable the automatic adjustment of data collection 
practices via embedded sensors, boundaries blur between data 
and AI. So-called smart machines learn from old data and collect 
new data differently. Data visualization tools are critical here, as 
are conceptual maps and models.98 
The worlds of data may be changing and expanding so quickly, and 
this three-part division of data-related resources may be so imprecise, 
that it may seem unwise to advance the concept of things as a key 
governance concept. Yet two brief examples illustrate how focusing 
on things in governance, and particularly in commons governance of 
shared data, can illuminate specific data-related challenges. 
A first example comes from outside the law, in coordination chal-
lenges among social groups within a given broad field. Academic 
researchers know this as the problem of coordinating across research 
disciplines. Because so much scholarly research now centers on 
data along with disciplinary knowledge, researchers confront new 
governance challenges even within institutions long associated with 
openness and sharing, such as scientific communities and research 
universities. The knowledge sharing norms of medical researchers 
overlap with but are also distinct from knowledge sharing norms of 
engineering researchers and social work researchers, for example. 
Data-as-form and data-as-flow have no consistent meanings, in 
practice, across different research traditions. In part, those differ-
ences are due to different histories of those fields. In part, those 
differences reflect different experiences with ethical frameworks, 
such as the Common Rule mentioned earlier. With respect to making 
productive uses of data, some of these differences and complexities 
can be bridged via computational techniques.99 Others can addressed 
by research strategies that implement “de-composability” ideas, by 
building research products that interoperate in modular ways with 
research products from other fields, like Lego bricks.100 But commons 
96 A McKenna and others, ‘The Genome Analysis Toolkit: A MapReduce 
Framework for Analyzing next-Generation DNA Sequencing Data’ (2010) 
20 Genome Research 1297.
97 Marcel Boumans and Sabina Leonelli, ‘From Dirty Data to Tidy Facts: Clus-
tering Practices in Plant Phenomics and Business Cycle Analysis’ in Sabina 
Leonelli and Niccolo Tempini (eds), Data Journeys in the Sciences (Springer 
2020) https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10871/40283 accessed 7 
February 2020.
98 Tony Hey, Stewart Tansley and Kristin Tolle (eds), The Fourth Paradigm: 
Data-Intensive Scientific Discovery (Microsoft Research 2009).
99 Paul R Cohen, ‘DARPA’s Big Mechanism Program’ (2015) 12 Physical Biolo-
gy 045008.
100 David Singh Grewal, ‘Before Peer Production: Infrastructure Gaps and the 
Architecture of Openness in Synthetic Biology’ (2017) 20 Stanford Technolo-
commons emphasizes how social groups develop governance to 
address social dilemmas, or problems in cooperation.90 Analysis of 
social dilemmas in complex settings may be simplified somewhat by 
techniques of “decomposing” large systems into small components.91 
Larger things may contain small things. 
In sum, as to the identity of relevant resources, the possible absence 
of linearity and the importance of context should be emphasized, and 
over-reliance on ex ante categorization should be avoided. That point 
has particular significance with respect to data. Modern research 
demonstrates how scientific research consists of reciprocating pro-
cesses rather than a progression from “basic knowledge” to “applied 
knowledge,” including technology development and commercial 
application.92 Likewise, research data production and management 
is now likewise often expressed in cyclical terms.93 Data are some-
times characterized entirely as an infrastructural resource.94 That 
focus highlights the many ways in which data use creates spillovers 
in multiple fields, in both expected and unexpected ways. But that 
infrastructural designation should be taken only as the beginning of 
an examination of appropriate governance, because infrastructure 
is a designed and socially constructed resource much as any other 
knowledge or information resource is.95
5.3 Things and Data
One strength of the word “resource” is that it properly evokes rela-
tionships between resources in resource systems or ecologies. Aware-
ness of data ecologies for governance analysis aligns specifically with 
the emphasis that the GKC framework places on governance in broad 
context. An ecological perspective requires examining interdepend-
encies between those resources and related resources, as systems, 
involving both immaterial and material attributes and evolution and 
variations across scales.
Understanding ecologies of data “things” should take account of the 
data collection and management practices associated with Big Data, 
with special attention given to the sources of the now-standard “three 
v’s” of Big Data (volume, variety, and velocity), all the way down to 
hand-curated data collections. Different settings, resources, and 
resource systems may call for different governance judgments as to 
relevant social groups and as data-as-form and data-as-flow consider-
ations. 
Those settings and resources may include the following. The classi-
fication below is crude. Many overlaps exist among tools, products, 
services, and research outputs, and multiple opportunities exist to 
deploy characterizations of data-as-form and data-as-flow.
• Techniques and technologies for observation, experimentation, 
data collection, association, and construction of databases and 
datasets. These may include physical devices (the Internet of 
Things and the Internet of Bodies) as well as digital protocols, 
including computer programs, data formats, and other digital 
standards) for sensing and observing, for data transmission and 
communication, and for creating and managing the resulting data 
collections. MapReduce is an example of a digital computing par-
90 Strandburg, Frischmann and Madison (n 54).
91 Simon (n 72).
92 Donald E Stokes, Pasteur’s Quadrant: Basic Science and Technological Inno-
vation (Brookings Institution Press 2011). 
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95 Frischmann, Infrastructure (n 50).
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a virtue (because giant data repositories can support streams of new, 
fantastic research), but it can also be a vice (because contributions of 
different fields and different resources may be difficult to separately 
identify and manage, in practice). With things as with groups, no pan-
acea exists, that is, no “one size fits all” solution. Data governance 
counsels taking an adaptable stance on data-as-form and data-as-flow 
questions, rather than a rigid or ontological one.
6. Looking Ahead
This article offers a conceptual toolkit for data governance that 
centers on two big themes: groups and things. Those can be 
combined in various ways as part of developing approaches to 
governance data collection, production, storage, stewardship, and 
use. Knowledge commons is proposed as a significant overarching 
framework for using these tools in developing data sharing strategies, 
but the tools are also relevant to understanding market-based or 
state-based institutional governance. As a conceptual approach, the 
pair of tools comes with few necessary payoffs or implications. For 
example, stereotypical lessons such as “define resources with clarity” 
or “determine boundaries regarding access and use with specificity” 
may have grounding in research on natural resources by Ostrom and 
others, but perspectives on knowledge and information resources 
teaches that different guidance may apply in those contexts, or some 
of them.108 The path forward lies as much in imaginative use of the 
concepts described here as in specific rules for specific problems. 
Four possible imaginative uses follow.
6.1 Examine Social Groups and Resources in Sys-
tems
Neither data governance nor knowledge commons should be imple-
mented in a single way across all fields and domains. Large-scale ini-
tiatives to promote openness in research science, AI systems, urban 
planning, public administration and law, environmental regulation, 
and public health face the difficult but critical challenge of inventory-
ing, understanding, and analyzing the technical, social and cultural, 
and legal attributes of polycentric ecologies. Data governance implies 
that collaboration strategies should be built out of those details. 
That implication applies to private collaboratives such as the Open 
Data Initiative supported by Microsoft and other technology com-
panies,109 and to individuals and enterprises advancing the Panton 
Principles, calling for open data in science.110 It applies to global 
NGOs focused on forward-looking uses of data such as AI for Good,111 
and private counterparts such as AI Commons112 and Open AI.113 It 
applies to governments. It applies to individual firms, to universities 
and research organizations, and even to individual policymakers, 
researchers, data scientists, and archivists. 
Relatedly, too much emphasis in developing effective and appropri-
ate data governance may be put on traditional distinctions between 
public and private enterprises and public and private goods. Simi-
larly, too much emphasis may be put on identifying and reinforcing 
distinctions between data and algorithms. Last, too much emphasis 
108  Madison, ‘IP Things as Boundary Objects’ (n 77).
109 https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/open-data-initiative.
110 https://pantonprinciples.org/index.html.
111 AI for Good is a United Nations platform for dialogue on future uses of 
artificial intelligence https://aiforgood.itu.int/.
112 AI Commons is a non-profit organization collecting diverse contributions 
to ensure that the benefits of AI systems are broadly distributed.  https://
aicommons.com/.
113 OpenAI is a private enterprise whose mission is to ensure that AI systems 
benefit all of humanity.  https://openai.com/.
governance strategies based on flexible understandings of the natures 
of research “things” provide an important set of tools, bringing these 
approaches together via a systems perspective.101 
A second example comes from within the law, from intellectual prop-
erty law and its treatment of data. Here, the problem is that treating a 
data resource as data-as-form or as data-as-flow in one IP system may 
push actors to change their characterization of resources with respect 
to a different system. Recently, the US Supreme Court invalidated pat-
ents on genetic sequences isolated from human genes, in Association 
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.102 That ruling undercut 
the power of the patentee, Myriad Genetics, to build a commercial 
business around genetic testing based on identifying those sequences 
in individuals. Those who supported invalidation and advocated 
for eliminating patent coverage of genetic sequences cheered. This 
appeared to be a win for research science, for the concept of knowl-
edge flow, and to many, for better clinical health outcomes and public 
health. Yet it appears that Myriad has adjusted its business strategy, 
applying non-patent strategies to enhance the exclusivity of the pools 
of research data that were used to develop the patented inventions.103 
What law seems to provide in one legal domain (data-as-flow), it 
seems to take away in another, at least in part (data-as-form).  Similar 
conflicts now exists with respect to public sector uses of DNA data 
in criminal proceedings, on the one hand, and trade secrecy law, on 
the other hand,104 and between public health objectives and efforts 
to protect patient privacy by granting property rights in personal data 
to individual patients.105  An ecological or systems approach may not 
solve these specific problems, but it would allow policymakers to 
anticipate them more clearly.106 
It should be emphasized that thing-ness or resource forms, whether 
given, designed, or constructed by law or otherwise, should not be 
viewed as necessarily hostile to efforts to promote data openness and 
data sharing. So long as the character and attributes of a knowledge 
resource are matters of design, including legal reinforcement or 
disruption of thing-ness, then the design of resources can be tailored 
appropriately to relevant governance goals. Building a data repository 
of shared scientific data, for example, typically requires coordina-
tion and collaboration as to technical matters (can one dataset be 
combined or coordinated with another dataset as matters of code?), 
as to legal matters (are enabling or disabling contracts, licenses, 
covenants, and/or laws present?), and as to social, cultural, and eco-
nomic matters (do libraries and archivists and research scientists and 
institutional administrators each understand, appreciate, and respect 
how field-specific expertise and other resources are needed to ensure 
the utility and stability of the repository?).107 
In conversations that embody those challenges, data-as-flow can be 
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mechanisms, even those that long pre-date the rise of Big Data, the 
internet era, or even twentieth century technology. Contemporary IP 
researchers have acquired a recent interest in informal, norm-gov-
erned innovation communities,117 where formal systems of IP rights 
as such seem to contribute little or not at all to developing bodies of 
novel and creative work. 
That interest in collective creativity can be traced back to the ear-
liest days of research science, in the Republic of Letters and the 
early Enlightenment in England, Scotland, and continental Europe. 
Communities of scientific researchers formed face to face and cor-
respondence networks, eventually becoming formalized in salons, 
scientific societies, and journals. This was not the practice of formal 
peer review. It was, instead, a polycentric network of social groups, 
regulating itself and the contents of their contributions via a complex 
system of social norms.118 That centuries-old style of knowledge com-
mons governance has been durable, adaptable, and effective. It may 
be relevant today.
6.4 Build Assessment Techniques
Perhaps the most difficult challenge to confront in designing and ana-
lyzing data governance is the question of assessment. Institutional 
design is significantly a question of comparative analysis. By what 
measure is one governance institution preferred to another?
Political theory, economic theory, and social theory have no short-
age of answers. Social welfare analysis gives us attention to outputs 
(utility, including spillovers) and to inputs (human capabilities and 
capacities). Social choice theory asks us to assess the character of 
processes of collective choice regarding institutional arrangements. 
Should institutions aggregate or otherwise accurate reflect the 
preferences of their participants? Political philosophy directs us to 
ask questions about legitimacy, transparency, accountability, and pro-
tection of primary values of individual human autonomy, including 
powers of self-determination regarding participation in the polity.119 
For example, a data governance community that sustains itself in 
coordination with the state differs from a nominally open community 
that proceeds only by relying on state-sanctioned legal instruments. 
Modern scientific research has the former character, given the 
abundant direct support and tax benefits offered to scientific research 
institutions and researchers themselves. Users of the Creative Com-
mons licensing tool likely have the second character; mere use of a 
Creative Commons license, taken alone, does not enroll the user in a 
collective or community of any sort, and the license instrument itself 
is a salient and near cousin of proprietary licenses.120 A group that 
manages an “open” resource, such as data, entirely via legal instru-
ments, is apt to encounter incompatibility problems. Not every open 
data license defines “open” the same way.121
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may be placed on the idea of data as an infrastructural resource and 
on data infrastructures. None of those distinctions are unimportant. 
How they are advanced, or modified, are questions for governance 
discussions.
6.2 Build Pragmatic Models of Policy Problems 
Data are sometimes viewed optimistically, as enabling spillover 
individual and social benefits, and sometimes skeptically, as con-
straining individuals or imposing harms.  An institutional governance 
framework supplies a useful method of integrating these different and 
sometimes disparate perspectives into a pragmatic, systems-based 
matrix. 
Efforts to “regulate” data production and use via public/private 
matrixes or on a field-by-field basis have often proved to be inade-
quate or inflexible, because regulators, policymakers, and scholars 
have too often tried to squeeze something that “looks and feels” 
like an intellectual resource into the IP categories that were con-
structed over the course of the twentieth century for other intellectual 
resources: copyright, patent, trade secrets and confidential informa-
tion, and related fields such as antitrust and unfair competition, and 
privacy. 
Positive law is thus seen in part as providing ways of solving social 
dilemmas regarding shared resources such as data, by encouraging 
collaboration via supplying state subsidies for infrastructure; creating 
safe harbors for commercial collaboration and exemptions from 
unfair competition and antitrust charges; exempting information from 
exclusionary IP regimes; offering convening and facilitation services; 
and in other ways.114 Positive law is also sometimes seen as impeding 
collaboration, creating social dilemmas rather than solving them. 
The idea of the anti-commons, in which a social space is character-
ized by too many separate property claims recognized by law, is one 
suggestive example.115 An approach that organizes data regulation by 
traditional legal field struggles to reconcile those perspectives.
A promising model for integrating them and others, using a prag-
matic approach based on a governance rubric, is the work of the polit-
ical scientist Martha Finnemore and the legal scholar Duncan Hollis 
on constructing “cybernorms” for global cybersecurity governance.116 
They argue that managing global cybersecurity data is a systemic 
and ecological problem; that it does not fit standard policy-specific 
boxes for diagnoses or solutions; and that polycentric, group-based 
strategies are most likely to be effective on grounds of legitimacy and 
adaptability. 
6.3 Expect Change, and Borrow From Experience
A pragmatic approach to data governance makes explicit that govern-
ance mechanisms must be adaptable, and they must be adaptable at 
different scales (small to large, slow to fast, local to global, existing to 
novel) and relative to different resources (human capabilities, social 
and institutional capabilities, and technological capabilities). 
That emphasis on adaptability brings out a possibly surprising feature 
of governance, and in particular data governance, that focuses on 
social groups and on things: its receptivity to established governance 
114 Jorge L Contreras, ‘Leviathan in the Commons: Biomedical Data and the 
State’ in Katherine J Strandburg, Brett M Frischmann and Michael J Madi-
son (eds), Governing Medical Knowledge Commons (Cambridge University 
Press 2017).
115 Michael A Heller, ‘The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transi-
tion from Marx to Markets’ (1998) 111 Harvard Law Review 621.
116 Martha Finnemore and Duncan B Hollis, ‘Constructing Norms for Global 
Cybersecurity’ (2016) 110 American Journal of International Law 425.
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Measures of experience on the ground matter. Does knowledge 
commons governance work? Is governance durable and sustaina-
ble across time (generations) and space (relevant state and other 
organizational boundaries and borders)? Does practice align with 
relevant ideology, including relevant rhetorics, enhancing not only its 
descriptive legitimacy (acceptability to the community and to society) 
but also its normative claims? 
The adaptability, flexibility, and even fuzziness of commons govern-
ance in information and data settings makes assessment even trick-
ier. Stipulating that data-as-form and data-as-flow are key governance 
attributes, that data may exist in multiple interpreted forms and flows 
simultaneously, and that resources and groups are often engaged 
in projects of producing and re-producing one another, complicates 
classic governance distinctions between individuals and collectives, 
people and things, and subjects and objects.  
7. Conclusion
In almost all contexts of interest for data governance purposes, data 
are likely to be shared. When, how, and why to share data are govern-
ance topics. This article has argued that the fundamental yet none-
theless pragmatic governance question for data is understanding 
different implications of seeing data-as-form and data-as-flow.  
This is a conceptual argument. It is undoubtedly true that where law 
meets technology, whether on economic grounds or social and cul-
tural terms, rules matter. Positive law matters, along with systems of 
social norms, customs, and conventions. Rights and interests matter, 
and their integration into regulatory frameworks matters, too. None-
theless, the article recommends beginning not with the rules but with 
questions of institutional design, motivated by key concepts. A well-
grounded domain of research exists focusing on shared knowledge, 
information, and data as objects and subjects of institutional govern-
ance. That domain is knowledge commons. Knowledge commons 
analysis argues for identifying and describing relevant social groups 
in which governance frameworks may be embedded, and for identify-
ing and describing relevant resources, or things, whose form and flow 
will contribute substantially to the welfare effects of the relevant data 
governance systems. Those are tools for data governance.
This perspective takes an ecological or systems approach to regula-
tory questions, an approach in which market exclusivities and state 
mandates do not provide the standard two-part regulatory framing. 
Knowledge commons governance, in which data and information 
resources are shared according to governance rules tied to identified 
social and institutional collectives, provides a substantial third store-
house of data governance solutions. 
